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I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 1987, Earl K. Shriner’s ten-year sentence for kidnapping
and assaulting two teenage girls was ending. Shriner was intellectu-
ally disabled and had a long history of killing, sexual assaulting, and
kidnapping.1 Prior to his release from a Washington prison, prison of-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* J.D., University of Nebraska College of Law, 2019.
** Robert J. Kutak Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology, Professor of Philoso-
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1. Roxanne Lieb, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: Legislative History
and Comparison with Other States, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y (1996), http://
www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1244/Wsipp_Washingtons-Sexually-Violent-Preda
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ficials learned that Shriner planned to torture and kill children after
his release. Officials attempted to prevent his release and detain him
under Washington’s general civil commitment laws; however, the law
required a recent overt act to establish dangerousness.2 Unable to
show a requisite act, Shriner was released. Two years later, he raped
and cut off the penis of a seven-year-old boy in Tacoma, Washington.3
One year earlier, a woman had been kidnapped and murdered by
Gene Raymond Kane, an inmate that had been placed on work release
after serving thirteen years for attacks on two women.4 Kane had
been rejected from the state mental hospital’s sexual pathology pro-
gram because he had been determined “too dangerous to handle.”5
Public outrage led the governor of Washington to establish a Commu-
nity Protection Task Force to recommend statutory changes.6 Before
the task force could make recommendations, another offender, Wesley
Allen Dodd, was arrested while attempting to abduct a six-year-old
boy from a movie theatre in Washington.7 Dodd subsequently con-
fessed to killing two boys that were riding their bikes in a park and to
kidnapping and brutally murdering a four-year-old boy who was play-
ing outside a school.8
The task force proposed a bill that included a civil commitment
statute authorizing the state to confine and treat a specific group of
sex offenders after their criminal sentence had been completed, and
the statute unanimously passed both houses of the legislature.9 The
constitutionality of the statute was challenged on the grounds that it
violated the Constitution’s double jeopardy and ex post facto protec-
tions.10 Upholding the statute, the Washington Supreme Court con-
cluded that it did not violate constitutional protections because the
statute was civil and not criminal in nature.11 However, a federal dis-
tor-Law-Legislative-History-and-Comparisons-With-Other-States_Full-Report
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/KF8Y-RABB].
2. Id. at 1.
3. Associated Press, Tacoma Sex Offender Faces Latest Charges in Mutilation of
Boy, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, MAY 23, 1989, B2.
4. Barry Siegel, Locking Up “Sexual Predators”: A Public Outcry in Washington
State Targeted Repeat Violent Sex Criminals: A New Preventive Law Would Keep
Them in Jail Indefinitely, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/
1990-05-10/news/mn-1433_1_sexual-predator [https://perma.unl.edu/VL6B-
QNGR].
5. Id.
6. Lieb, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Id.
8. Carol M. Ostrom & Jack Broom, Westley Dodd: A Long, Steady Slide into Dark
Desperation, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 3, 1993), http://community.seattletimes.nw
source.com/archive/?date=19930103&slug=1677933 [https://perma.unl.edu/
5CBX-GG59].
9. Lieb, supra note 1, at 1.
10. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
11. Id.
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trict court ruled that the statute violated (1) substantive due process
by permitting indefinite confinement without the requirement of
mental illness, (2) the ex post facto clause because the law was puni-
tive and retrospectively applied, and (3) the double jeopardy clause
because the offender had already been convicted and incarcerated for
the criminal conduct.12 The case was being appealed in the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a similar
statute in Kansas v. Hendricks.13
After a sex offender’s criminal sentence has been served, sexually
violent predator (SVP) laws permit post-incarceration confinement if
the offender is determined to be likely to commit future sexual
crimes.14 The earliest “sexual psychopath” laws were enacted in the
1930s, and these laws confined sex offenders in prisons. Michigan en-
acted the first such law in 1937; however, it was quickly determined to
be unconstitutional.15 Currently, at least twenty states have SVP
statutes, and most require the state to satisfy three elements: (1) the
offender was convicted of or charged with a sexual offense, (2) the of-
fender has a mental disorder or abnormality, and (3) the offender is
likely to engage in further sexually violent conduct.16 Following Hen-
dricks, the constitutionality and application of SVP statutes continues
to be controversial.
This Article will first explore the justification used in SVP legisla-
tion. Second, it will discuss the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
criminal punishment as civil commitment. Third, it will illustrate how
the lack of measurable standards makes SVP statutes unworkable.
And finally, this Article will suggest that states replace SVP legisla-
tion with criminal statutes for those offenders that are criminally cul-
pable and use general civil commitment laws for offenders that are
exculpable by reason of severe mental illness.
II. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR SVP LEGISLATION
A. Police Power and Parens Patriae
The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause includes the
right to be free from bodily restraint.17 This liberty interest is impli-
cated in involuntary civil commitments, so a commitment must be jus-
tified as necessary to balance “the liberty of the individual” against
12. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
13. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
14. See generally Frederick J. Hacker & Marcel Flynn, The Sexual Psychopath Act in
Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 766 (1955).
15. David DeMatteo et al., A National Survey of United States Sexually Violent Per-
son Legislation: Policy, Procedures, and Practice, 14 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL
HEALTH 245, 245–66 (2015).
16. Id.
17. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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“the demands of an organized society.”18 Involuntary civil commit-
ment is justified on two grounds: a state’s police power and parens
patriae authority.19 A state has police power to protect the public from
harm. In Jacobsen v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court held that a Massachusetts statute requiring vaccination against
smallpox was a constitutional use of the state’s police power.20 The
Court described a state’s police power as that which “must be held to
embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public
safety.”21 Under this power, an individual may be confined to protect
the public from harm or the threat of injury to personal property.22
Police power is most often employed in the criminal justice system to
incarcerate convicted offenders.23 While this power may be used to
punish and incapacitate convicted offenders, generally police power
cannot be used to prevent future crimes because “[e]vidence of propen-
sity can be considered relatively unreliable and more difficult for a
defendant to rebut . . . .”24 However, the Court has held that civil com-
mitment may be used to confine persons with mental disorders based
on a prediction of dangerousness using a state’s police power and
parens patriae authority.25
Parens patriae means “parent of the country.”26 Under the doctrine
of parens patriae, the government has a duty to take care of those who
cannot care for themselves. This doctrine arose from common law and
has been explained by the Court as being
derived from the English constitutional system. As the system developed from
its feudal beginnings, the King retained certain duties and powers, which
were referred to as the “royal prerogative” . . . . These powers and duties were
said to be exercised by the King in his capacity as guardian of persons under
legal disabilities to act for themselves. For example, Blackstone refers to the
sovereign or his representative as “the general guardian of all infants, idiots,
and lunatics.” Under this doctrine, the government has a duty to care for
those who cannot care for themselves.27
18. Id. at 320 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
19. See United States v. Comstock, 650 U.S. 126, 164 (2010) (recognizing that States
have enacted civil-commitment laws under their parens patriae and general po-
lice powers).
20. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
21. Id. at 25.
22. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975).
23. See generally Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (discussing the authority of
the states to define and enforce criminal laws).
24. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 524, 532 (1968).
25. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
26. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex. rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
27. Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972).
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This doctrine is often invoked with juveniles and incompetent per-
sons.28 For example, in Schall v. Martin, the Court explained that
“[c]hildren, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take
care of themselves.”29 They are assumed to be the subject of the con-
trol of their parents, and if parental control falters, the state must
play its part as parens patriae.”30 A state may also use its parens pa-
triae authority to appoint guardians to make decisions and manage
the affairs of incompetent persons.31 Ideally, when a state acts as a
substitute decision-maker under its parens patriae power, it should
make determinations the way an individual would if he or she were
fully competent.32 In O’Connor v. Donaldson, Chief Justice Burger ex-
plained that when exercising parens patriae power, “[a]t a minimum,
a particular scheme for the protection of the mentally ill must rest
upon a legislative determination that is compatible with the best in-
terests of the affected class and that its members are unable to act for
themselves.”33
The authority under parens patriae presumes that the individual
to which it is applied does not have the capacity to manage his or her
own affairs. If an individual is dangerous but does not lack this capac-
ity, states may not commit the individual under the doctrine of parens
patriae alone. The state’s police power is also insufficient because “a
finding of dangerousness alone is ordinarily not sufficient ground on
which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment.”34 A state’s au-
thority under general involuntary commitment statutes requires
parens patriae or police power.35 In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme
Court described this authority when it stated: “The state has a legiti-
mate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its
citizens who are unable because of emotional disorder to care for
themselves; the state also has the authority under its police power to
protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some whom
who are mentally ill.”36 Thus, in order to justify an individual’s con-
finement, the individual must be both mentally ill and dangerous, ei-
ther to himself/herself or to others.
28. See Alfred A. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. 592 (providing a summary of case law
involving the doctrine of parens patriae).
29. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
30. Id. at 265.
31. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 370–71 (3d ed. 2007).
32. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Developments in the Law, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190 (1974).
33. 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring).
34. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
35. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
36. Id.
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B. The Constitutionality of Civil Confinement
While SVP laws authorize civil commitment, they differ from gen-
eral commitment laws because SVP laws are typically used to confine
a criminal offender after his or her prison sentence. Because the of-
fender has already been convicted and served his or her sentence, due
process issues arise, but the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently up-
held the constitutionality of current SVP laws. For example, in Hen-
dricks, the Court upheld Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act after
the Kansas legislature had enacted the statute to address the problem
of sexual offender recidivism.37 The statute provided procedures for
the civil commitment of “any person who had been convicted of or
charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or a personality disorder which makes the person likely
to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.”38 “Mental abnor-
mality” was defined by the statute as a “congenital or acquired condi-
tion affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes
the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting
such person a menace to the health and safety of others.”39 In the
Act’s preamble, the Kansas legislature laid out the reasons for this
statute, stating:
[A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist
who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for
involuntary treatment pursuant to [Kansas’s general involuntary civil com-
mitment statute] . . . . In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment
under the [general involuntary civil commitment statute], sexually violent
predators generally have anti-social personality features which are unamen-
able to existing mental illness treatment modalities and those features render
them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior. The legislature further
finds that sexually violent predators’ likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of
predatory sexual violence is high. The existing involuntary commitment pro-
cedure . . . is inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators
pose to society. The legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitat-
ing sexually violent predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs
of this population are very long term and the treatment modalities for this
population are very different than the traditional treatment modalities for
people appropriate for commitment under the [general involuntary civil com-
mitment statute].40
Leroy Hendricks was convicted of taking indecent liberties with
two thirteen-year-old boys and, after serving almost ten years, he was
scheduled to be released to a halfway house.41 Prior to his release, the
State of Kansas filed a petition under its Sexually Violent Predator
Act seeking civil commitment.42 Hendricks moved to dismiss the
37. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
38. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1994).
39. Id.
40. § 59-20a01.
41. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354–55.
42. Id. at 346.
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State’s petition on the grounds that the Act was unconstitutional.43
The trial court reserved ruling on whether the Act violated the U.S.
Constitution; however, it found that there was probable cause to sup-
port a finding that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator and or-
dered him to be evaluated at a state hospital.44 At a jury trial on the
issue of whether he was a sexual predator, evidence was introduced
demonstrating Hendricks’s diagnosis of pedophilia and his long his-
tory of sexually abusing children.45 Hendricks agreed that he was a
pedophile and stated that the only way to prevent him from sexually
abusing children was for him “to die.”46 The jury ordered him commit-
ted after it unanimously found Hendricks was a predator.47 On ap-
peal, Hendricks claimed, inter alia, that the Kansas statute
constituted an ex post facto law and double jeopardy, thus violating his
right to due process.48 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Act
violated due process because, under Addington, a civil commitment
required a determination that a person is (1) mentally ill and (2) a
danger to himself or others.49 The court noted that Hendricks’s
pedophilia was a mental abnormality—not a mental illness.50
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.51 The Court ruled that the Act’s
definition of “mental abnormality” satisfied due process requirements
because it required proof of “past sexually violent behavior and a pre-
sent mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the
future if the person is not incapacitated.”52 The Court explained that
while dangerousness alone is generally insufficient for involuntary
commitment, it had upheld statutes that required a proof of danger-
ousness with “some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or
‘mental abnormality.’”53 The Court concluded that pedophilia was a
serious mental disorder, as classified by the American Psychiatric As-
sociation (APA) and that this condition, along with Hendricks’s lack of
volitional control over his dangerousness, satisfied due process
requirements.54
The Court also rejected Hendricks’s claims that the Act violated
the Constitution’s protections against ex post facto laws and double
jeopardy. The Court held that the Act did not violate the ex post facto
43. Id. at 354.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 350.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 355.
48. Id.
49. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
50. Id.
51. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
52. Id. at 358.
53. Id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (“Previous instances of violent be-
havior are an important indicator of future violent tendencies.”)).
54. Id. at 360.
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clause because the clause only applied to penal statutes and the Act
did not impose punishment.55 The Court also held that the Act did not
violate double jeopardy protections because it was not a criminal pro-
ceeding as evidenced by both its purpose of protecting the public from
harm and by its placement in Kansas’s civil code.56 Finally, the Court
concluded that the law was not established “to punish past misdeeds,
but primarily to show the accused’s mental condition and to predict
future behavior” and that it did “not implicate either of the two pri-
mary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence.”57
In short, the Court’s holding permitted a person to be civilly commit-
ted if that person currently suffers from a “mental abnormality” or
“personality disorder” and there is a likelihood that the person will
engage in future conduct that is dangerous to the public. In upholding
the Kansas statute as constitutional, the Court reasoned that “some
additional factor” satisfied due process.58 This factor may include a
mental abnormality or personality disorder, including a lack of voli-
tional control.59 With its determination that the statute was civil in
nature, the Court allowed states to bypass the criminal justice sys-
tem’s due process protections and permitted an individual to be con-
victed, sentenced, incarcerated, and then subsequently committed and
confined again—indefinitely.
Pre-Hendricks, the Court had consistently held that a civil commit-
ment required both (1) mental illness and (2) dangerousness.60 The
Court had explained that the purpose of commitment “is to treat the
individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from his poten-
tial dangerousness.”61 However, when an individual is no longer dan-
gerous or is no longer insane, he must be released62 because due
process requires that “the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.”63 Another context in which civil commitments are used is
after an insanity acquittal. The Supreme Court has held that when a
criminal defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, both re-
quirements are satisfied and the defendant may be automatically com-
mitted.64 In that context, the defendant’s mental illness exempts him
55. Id. at 370.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 360–61.
58. Id. at 358.
59. Id.
60. See generally Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
61. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
62. Id.
63. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
64. Jones, 463 U.S. at 355 (“The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness.”).
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from criminal responsibility for his conduct, but he may be committed
because he both is mentally ill and dangerous.65
In Foucha v. Louisiana,66 the Supreme Court held 5–4 that when
an individual committed as a result of an insanity acquittal is later
determined not “mentally ill,” the individual must be released, even if
that individual is still dangerous. Four years after being acquitted by
reason of insanity, doctors testified that Foucha’s offense was likely
the result of a drug-induced psychosis and that he no longer showed
signs of mental illness; however, he had an antisocial personality
which was not a mental disease and not treatable.67 After a bench
trial, the court ruled that Foucha was dangerous to himself and others
and held that Foucha’s commitment could continue.68 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Foucha must be released because the ba-
sis for his confinement no longer existed. The Court stated:
A State, pursuant to its police power, may imprison convicted criminals for
the purposes of deterrence and retribution. But there are constitutional limi-
tations on the conduct that a State may criminalize. . . . Here, the State has no
such punitive interest. As Foucha was not convicted, he may not be punished.
Here, Louisiana has by reason of his acquittal exempted Foucha from criminal
responsibility . . . .69
The Court held that Foucha’s continued confinement was imper-
missible because a person may not be confined by civil commitment
without a determination that he is both mentally ill and dangerous.70
Foucha was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder “for which
there is no effective treatment,” and ordered him released because he
was determined to no longer be “mentally ill.”71 The Court rejected the
state’s argument that Foucha could be indefinitely confined because
his antisocial personality sometimes led to aggressive conduct, stating
“[t]his rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely any other
insanity acquittee not mentally ill who could be shown to have a per-
sonality disorder that may lead to criminal conduct.”72 This holding
cannot be reconciled with the Court’s holding in Hendricks.
In Hendricks, the Court employed this very rationale in holding
that Kansas’s law was constitutional. The Court permitted Hen-
dricks’s indefinite confinement because he was found to have a
“mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it difficult,
if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.73
65. Id.
66. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 75.
69. Id. at 80 (internal citations omitted).
70. Id. at 82.
71. Id. at 77.
72. Id. at 82.
73. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
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The Court’s determination that pedophilia was a “mental abnormal-
ity” that renders one unable to control behavior ultimately justified
commitment based on the classification of pedophilia alone.
III. A LACK OF MEASURABLE STANDARDS MAKE SVP
STATUTES UNWORKABLE
A. The Court’s Vague Mental Illness Standard
The Supreme Court has consistently held that involuntary civil
commitment requires both a mental illness and future dangerous-
ness.74 Schopp defines legal mental illness as a “psychological impair-
ment that renders a person incapable of meeting some legally relevant
standard of adequate functioning and thus renders that person ineligi-
ble for a specified legal status and the rights or liabilities associated
with that status.”75 In Hendricks, the Court not only held that a
“mental abnormality” satisfied the requirement of “mental illness,” it
also held that a “lack of volitional control” was sufficient for “mental
abnormality.”76 Volition is defined as the ability to make a choice or
determine something.77 The Court stated that Hendricks’s “admitted
lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future danger-
ousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous
persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through
criminal proceedings.”78 The Court’s reasoning lacks consistency.
To be criminally responsible requires a voluntary act by the of-
fender.79 If Hendricks was unable to control his conduct, he could not
be criminally responsible for the conduct, and he would be ineligible
for punishment. The Court was clearly using facts from Hendricks’s
offense while ignoring the fact that he had been dealt with through
criminal proceedings where he was convicted and sentenced. Morse
described the ultimate result of this holding when stating:
[T]he criminal justice system blamed and punished him for yielding to his
allegedly uncontrollable urges; the sexual predator commitment system in ef-
fect excused him, found him non-responsible, because it committed him on the
ground that he could not control precisely the same urges and related conduct
74. See supra note 60.
75. Robert F. Schopp, Civil Commitment and Sexual Predators: Competence and Con-
demnation, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’ Y & L. 323, 339–40 (1998).
76. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
77. Volition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
78. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
79. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note (AM. LAW INST., 1962) (“[T]he
fundamental predicate for all criminal liability, that the guilt of the defendant be
based upon conduct, and that the conduct include a voluntary act or an omission
to perform an act of which the defendant was physically capable.”); ROBERT F.
SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY (1991) (stating that criminal responsibility requires both a voluntary act and
the ability to engage in practical reasoning).
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that led to the ten-year prison sentence for sexual molestation that preceded
his commitment.80
The Court determined that Hendricks lacked “volitional control”;81
however, the criminal prohibition and punishment of predatory sexual
assaults requires an offender to have some degree of control over his
or her conduct.82 The nature of predatory sexual assaults requires
that an offender restrain from such acts in public to avoid immediate
detection. This restraint demonstrates the ability to choose when and
where to engage in the offensive conduct. Offenders like Hendricks
must engage in planning and strategy to establish circumstances
where he would have the opportunity to assault his victims.
Pedophilia may be a mental disorder or character trait that makes it
difficult to refrain from molesting children, but an offender acts inten-
tionally when yielding to his desire to do so. A predatory sexual of-
fender’s ability to deliberate about whether to commit an act is
evidence that the offender can engage in practical reasoning.83 Pre-
sumably, Hendricks was able to choose not to engage in child molesta-
tion under certain circumstances, and if an offender can make a
deliberate choice to engage in conduct or to not engage in conduct, the
offender does not lack volitional control.84
In a subsequent case challenging Kansas’s statute, the Supreme
Court further relaxed its mental illness requirement. In Kansas v.
Crane,85 the Supreme Court clarified that its ruling in Hendricks did
not require a “total or complete lack of control,” but a “ ‘mental abnor-
mality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it ‘difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.’”86
In discussing whether an “emotional impairment” would be sufficient
for civil commitment, the Court stated that while most cases would
involve persons that were unable to control their urges as Hendricks
had been, other sex offenders with emotional or psychiatric illnesses
that involved “compulsive, repetitive, or driven behavior” may also be
determined to be “unable to control their dangerousness.”87
The Court noted that it had not narrowly defined “lack of control”
because states had “considerable leeway” in defining mental abnor-
mality and personality disorder.88 More importantly, the Court recog-
nized that it could not set precise rules in this area because of the
80. Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV.
1025, 1054 (2002).
81. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
82. SCHOPP, supra note 79, at 193.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
86. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 413–14.
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struggle with merging psychiatry and the law.89 The Court articu-
lated this struggle when stating “the science of psychiatry which in-
forms, but does not control ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-
advancing science, whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror
those of the law.”90 The Court highlighted psychiatry’s inability to
clearly distinguish between “a defective understanding or apprecia-
tion” and an “ability to control . . . behavior,” and left open the possibil-
ity that an “emotional” impairment would constitute the requisite
“mental abnormality.”91 Recognizing that it had not “distinguished for
constitutional purposes among volitional, emotional, and cognitive im-
pairments,” the Court attempted to establish some limit when it indi-
cated that “there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling
behavior.”92
Arguably, the Court’s holding in Crane permits involuntary com-
mitment on a finding of dangerousness alone. Many normal citizens
would state that they lack self-control or that they have lost control at
a specific time.93 This standard’s vagueness gives courts little direc-
tion for determining whether a person cannot control his or her behav-
ior and, as a result, permits states to find a “mental abnormality” with
any failure to refrain from conduct. Justice Scalia’s dissent articulated
this struggle, calling the decision “a remarkable feat of jurisprudential
jujitsu” and blaming the Court for leaving the law “in such a state of
utter indeterminacy.”94
I suspect that the reason the Court avoids any elaboration is that elaboration
which passes the laugh test is impossible. How is one to frame for a jury the
degree of “inability to control” which, in the particular case, “the nature of the
psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality” require?
Will it be a percentage (“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may commit
Mr. Crane under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
he is 42% unable to control his penchant for sexual violence”)? Or a frequency
ratio (“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane under
the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is unable to
control his penchant for sexual violence 3 times out of 10”)? Or merely an
adverb (“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane under
the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is appreciably-
or moderately, or substantially, or almost totally-unable to control his
penchant for sexual violence”)? None of these seems to me satisfactory.95
Morse argues for an abandonment of volitional impairments as legal
criteria because the standard imposes “almost no limit on commit-
89. Id. at 413.
90. Id. at 407–08.
91. Id. at 415.
92. Id. at 412, 414–15.
93. Morse, supra note 80.
94. Crane, 534 U.S. at 423–24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
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ment.”96 To distinguish a desire and a reflexive bodily movement,
Morse analogizes strong desires to the full bladder.
Assume that an agent needs to urinate, but is unable to find an appropriate
place to do so. As time passes and the bladder continues to fill, the desire to
urinate will become increasingly powerful and unpleasant. At some point,
however, the person’s bladder will empty because the pressure on the urethral
(urinary) sphincter will mechanically force it to open; he or she will no longer
be able to “hold it in,” no matter what the cost might be for doing so. For
example, suppose the agent is threatened with death for permitting his blad-
der to empty. The agent will surely exercise control for a very lengthy period,
but all agents will finally empty their bladders because, ultimately, voiding
will be a product of literally uncontrollable mechanism. The sphincter “fails”
because the physical pressure on it is too great.
Strong desires are allegedly analogous to the full bladder. Increasing desire is
analogized to increasing pressure on the sphincter, and we are supposed to
conclude that people are no more responsible for yielding to some desires than
they are for emptying their bladders. But desires are not physical forces, ac-
tions are not mechanisms, and people are not sphincters. There are no “desire
units” that will finally mechanistically force the “action switch” to flip if
enough “desire units” are added.97
The Court requires “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behav-
ior,”98 yet courts are unable to objectively examine an individual’s
ability to control or resist his or her desires. Hence, volitional impair-
ments should not be used to satisfy the legal requirement of mental
illness.
The APA has also recommended that the volitional element not be
used in the context of the insanity defense, stating that “a mental dis-
order which can potentially lead to exculpation ‘should usually be of
the severity (if not the quality) of conditions that psychiatrists diag-
nose as psychoses.”99 Another medical organization, the Association
for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, called the volitional impairment
standard “meaningless and unworkable.”100 The American Bar Asso-
ciation has also recommended that the volitional test not be used be-
cause of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of distinguishing between
an “irresistible impulse” and an “impulse that cannot be resisted.”101
The use of a volitional standard is not the only conflict between the
APA and the courts. There has also been considerable struggle in the
96. Morse, supra note 80.
97. Id. at 1057.
98. See Crane, 534 U.S at 414–15.
99. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n Insanity Def. Work Group, Statement on the Insanity De-
fense, reprinted in 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681–88 (1983).
100. Brief for the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957), 2001
WL 670067, at *2.
101. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 339–42
(1984); see also Christopher Slogobin, The American Bar Association’s Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards: Revisions for the Twenty-First Century, 41
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (Dec. 13, 2016).
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use of the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM) for legal conclusions. The DSM is a diagnostic tool pub-
lished by the APA that is primarily used by the medical
community.102 The DSM is also used extensively in legal proceedings,
arguably because the Supreme Court has failed to establish sufficient
legal standards or definitions of mental illness or mental abnormali-
ties. In Hendricks, the Court stated that the “mental abnormality” re-
quirement was satisfied because Hendricks’s pedophilia was listed as
a “mental disorder” in the DSM.103 In Crane, however, the Court rec-
ognized that “the science of psychiatry, which informs but does not
control ultimate legal determinations, is an ever-advancing science,
whose distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law.”104
The APA explicitly warned against using its standards for SVP com-
mitment when stating that the DSM’s
comprehensive classification schemes are not restricted to identifying those
persons who warrant involuntary treatment, let alone confinement. Nor are
they designed to identify those subject to various legal standards, such as
those for involuntary confinement. Thus, the authors of DSM-IV caution that
‘[i]n most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV mental disorder is not
sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a ‘mental disorder,’
‘mental disability,’ ‘mental disease,’ or ‘mental defect.’105
In Clark v. Arizona,106 the Supreme Court itself warned against using
the DSM as evidence of a mental disease, recognizing that “dangers
arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate
concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical
diagnosis.”107
In the context of SVP commitments, the failure to construct a suffi-
cient legal standard and the resulting reliance on the DSM causes
mental abnormalities to be defined by the offender’s conduct. For ex-
ample, the current DSM-V defines pedophilic disorder as “a paraphilia
involving intense and recurrent sexual urges towards and fantasies
about prepubescent children that have either been acted upon or
which cause the person with the attraction distress or interpersonal
difficulty.”108 The classification itself includes an inherent danger
that a person with the disorder will act on his urges and sexually as-
102. Cia Bearden, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal Arena: A Proposition for
Curtaining Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 79 (2012).
103. Kansas v. Hendricks, 541 U.S. 346, 372 (1997).
104. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
105. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Leroy Hendricks, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649), 1996
WL 469200, at *23.
106. 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
107. Id. at 774.
108. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
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sault children.109 In using the DSM’s classification of pedophilia, the
classification is the legal justification for commitment: the offense of
child molestation leads to a classification of pedophilia, and the classi-
fication satisfies both the “mental abnormality” and dangerousness re-
quirements. Thus, the convicting offense of child molestation may
itself be sufficient for indefinite confinement.
SVP statutes protect society by permitting the indefinite confine-
ment of pedophiles, but this raises the question of whether civil com-
mitment would be justified in other contexts as well. For example,
kleptomania is a mental disorder defined in the DSM-V as a
“[r]ecurrent failure to resist urges to steal objects that are not needed
for personal use or for their monetary value.”110 The Supreme Court
has held that an individual’s conviction for a criminal act satisfies the
dangerousness requirement even if it is a non-violent crime against
property.111 Following this reasoning, the definition of kleptomania
satisfies both the “mental abnormality” and the “dangerousness”
prongs for civil commitment. When mental health laws are permissi-
bly exploited for one class of individuals, there is an inherent danger
that these laws may be more broadly applied to other individuals as
well.
B. The Danger of Predicting Dangerousness
Along with a showing of “mental illness,” civil commitment re-
quires a determination that an individual is dangerous. This requires
a finding that an individual will likely engage in future conduct that is
dangerous to the public or the individual.112 An individual is danger-
ous if the probability and severity of his or her potential reoffending
are high enough to justify commitment,113 but there is a risk of recidi-
vism with all individuals convicted of a crime. In 2014, the Depart-
ment of Justice reported that 67.8% of all released state prisoners
were arrested for a new crime within three years and 76.6% were ar-
rested within five years.114 In a similar study of sex offenders, only
3.5% were reconvicted of a sex crime within three years.115 Because
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364–65 (1983).
112. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360–61 (1997).
113. Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz, Marc W. Pearce & Robert F. Schopp, Dangerousness,
Risk Assessment, and Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 471
(2004).
114. MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU JUST.
STATS., NCJ244205, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005:
PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 (2014).
115. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUST.
STATS., NCJ198281, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN
1994 (2003).
1182 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1167
sex offenders have a significantly lower risk of reoffending than non-
sex offenders, the severity of harm likely with sexual offenses is used
to justify commitment. However, in a longitudinal study published by
the Department of Justice, only 1.3% of rapists and 2.5% of child mo-
lesters were rearrested for molesting a child after release.116 The vast
majority of sex crimes against children that were committed by re-
leased prisoners were by prisoners that had not been convicted of prior
sexual offenses.117 While 83% of these crimes were committed by indi-
viduals that did not have a prior conviction for a sex crime, individuals
with a prior sexual offense accounted for only 17%.118
Because sex offenders have a very low probability of reoffending,
the threshold of risk sufficient for commitment must necessarily be
low. The Court has held that while criminal convictions require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, an offender may be committed under an
SVP statute using a clear and convincing standard.119 At least half of
the states with SVP laws use this less stringent standard.120 The lan-
guage of SVP statutes also makes a determination of dangerousness
easily attainable. Most states define “sexually violent predator” as a
person who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.121
Statutory definitions of “likely” include such language as “substan-
tially probable,”122 “more likely than not,”123 and “the person’s pro-
pensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose
a threat to the health and safety of others.”124 It is also significant
that only two states require a recent overt act to establish a finding of
dangerousness.125
The use of estimated risk raises genuine questions regarding relia-
bility. Estimates of dangerousness are made using opinion testimony
116. Id. at 31.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
120. DeMatteo et al., supra note 15.
121. Id.
122. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (2012).
123. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(4) (2017); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.480(5) (2017);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(7) (2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(1m)
(2015).
124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(4) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29(a02(3); N.J. STAT.
§ 30:4-27.26; S.C. CODE § 44-48-30(9) (2013); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-
174.01(2) (2009) (defining likely to mean “the person’s propensity to commit sex
offenses resulting in serious harm to others is of such a degree as to pose a men-
ace to the health and safety of the public”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(VI)
(2015) (defining likely to mean “the person’s propensity to commit acts of sexual
violence is of such a degree that the person has serious difficulty in controlling his
or her behavior as to pose a potentially serious likelihood of danger to others”).
125. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(4); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(7).
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by mental health professionals and actuarial testing.126 Mental
health professionals are asked to assess an individual’s level of risk;
however, there is considerable evidence that these estimates are not
reliable. In Barefoot v. Estelle,127 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether mental health expert testimony regarding a defen-
dant’s future dangerousness was constitutional in the context of capi-
tal punishment. Under Texas law, a sentence of death required the
jury to find “a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to soci-
ety.”128 Both the defendant and the APA argued that the expert testi-
mony used to predict the defendant’s future risk was unreliable.129
The Court rejected the APA’s argument that psychiatrists were not
experts in assessing future risk, stating that the adversarial system
would be able to discover reliability issues.130 The Court further noted
that the APA had argued that psychiatrists predicting future danger-
ousness were wrong “only most of the time,” and not all of the time.131
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,132 evidence of future dangerousness must be
the product of reliable principles and methods to ensure scientific va-
lidity.133 Estimates of dangerousness by mental health professionals
have not been shown to be reliable, but they are still used in SVP com-
mitment proceedings.134 Several studies show that these estimates
are no more accurate than chance.135 When discussing the ability of
psychiatrists and psychologists to predict future dangerousness,
Schopp and Quattrocchi observed:
Unfortunately, a rather large and consistent body of empirical evidence indi-
cates that the standards of the profession include no ability to accurately pre-
dict dangerous behavior. Not only have psychologists and psychiatrists been
unable to predict dangerousness to a degree of accuracy which would justify
126. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (“Whether the individual is men-
tally ill and dangerous to either himself or others . . . turns on the meaning of the
facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.”).
127. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
128. Id. at 884.
129. Id. at 898–99.
130. Id. at 899.
131. Id. at 901.
132. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., In re Graham, 837 N.W.2d 382, 385 (N.D. 2013) (stating that State law
requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is
sexually dangerous).
135. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 918 (Blackmun J., dissenting); THOMAS W. CAMPBELL,
ASSESSING SEX OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS 94–97 (2004) (citing research
showing violence prediction error rates ranging from fifty-four percent to ninety-
four percent).
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infringing on a client’s rights, they have been unable to predict any more accu-
rately than have nonprofessionals.136
Schopp and Quattrocchi have also stated that even if dangerousness
was able to be accurately predicted, clinicians should not do so.137
“Clinicians who predict dangerousness distort the meaning of ‘danger-
ousness’ in the statute by misrepresenting it as an empirical predic-
tion, obscuring the normative component and misdirecting the
temporal focus from the present to the future.”138 While subjective ex-
pert opinion testimony is still employed in SVP commitments, other
objective actuarial tools are more generally used in assessing future
risk.139
Actuarial tools use statistics taken from groups to predict an indi-
vidual’s likelihood of engaging in certain behaviors.140 When a group
of individuals have a known history, an individual’s relative risk as-
sessment is based on the traits that the individual has in common
with the group.141 In the context of SVP commitments, the most com-
monly used instrument is the STATIC-99 which measures ten factors
that have been shown to relate to recidivism.142 These factors include
the number of prior sex offenses; the number of prior sentencing
dates; if the offender has any convictions for non-contact sex offenses;
prior nonsexual violence; any unrelated victims; any victims that were
strangers; any victims that were male; the offender’s current age; and
whether the offender has lived with a significant other for at least two
years.143 The STATIC-99 has been criticized as not identifying offend-
ers that are at high-risk for recidivism, having risks of scoring errors,
and failing to take into account significant differences between differ-
ent types of sex offenders.144 In Crane, the Supreme Court stated that
SVP commitment requires that an offender’s estimated future danger-
ousness “must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual of-
fender . . . from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an
136. Robert F. Schopp & Michael R. Quattrochi, Tarasoff, The Doctrine of Special Re-
lationships, and the Psychotherapist’s Duty to Warn, C.L. FAC. PUB. 12, 23 (1984).
137. Robert F. Schopp & Michael R. Quattrocchi, Predicting the Present: Expert Testi-
mony and Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 159 (1995).
138. Id.
139. See In re R.S., 801 A.2d 219, 221 (N.J. 2002); In re Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 713
(Wash. 2003) (permitting the use of Screening Scale for Pedophilic Interests
(SSPI) as an actuarial instrument to assess an offender’s risk of recidivism).
140. John A. Fennel, Punishment by Another Name: The Inherent Overreaching in
Sexually Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON-
FINEMENT 37, 52 (2009).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 54.
143. R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessments for Sex Offend-
ers: A Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120
(2000).
144. CAMPBELL, supra note 135.
2019] SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS 1185
ordinary criminal case.”145 The tools currently used to estimate dan-
gerousness clearly do not meet this standard.
The threshold used in estimating dangerousness dichotomizes an
offender’s risk of future sexual violence by classifying individuals as
either dangerous or not dangerous.146 The use of this dangerous/not
dangerous threshold generally focuses only on an offender’s risk fac-
tors and does not include a more thorough analysis weighing both the
likelihood and the degree of future harm.147 In addition, the current
use of risk assessment in SVP commitments does not include an anal-
ysis of certain “protective” factors that may mitigate the future risk of
harm.148 Protective factors may be personal or situational and are de-
fined as “any characteristic of a person, his or her environment or situ-
ation which reduces risk of future violent behavior.”149 Such factors
include social support, positive attitudes towards authority, work, fi-
nancial management, and motivation for treatment.150 While the exis-
tence of such protective factors has been shown to reduce an offender’s
risk of future sexual violence,151 these factors are generally not used
when determining requisite dangerousness.152 Forensic practice
scholar Richard Rogers calls these risk-only evaluations “inherently
inaccurate” and argues that these assessments “represent implicitly
biased evaluations with grave, often negative consequences to forensic
populations.”153
Without reliable standards, the problem then becomes how the
risk of dangerousness can be estimated. Unfortunately, judges are
forced to rely on inaccurate assessments and subjective determina-
tions. Research has demonstrated that judges most often rely on cate-
gorical estimates of risk (high vs. low) rather than percentages or
statistical probabilities.154 Forty years ago, Stephen J. Morse, writing
on mental health, warned against using categorical estimates because
of the lack of agreed-upon scientific meaning in legal prediction crite-
145. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
146. Michael R. Quattrocchi & Robert F. Schopp, Tarasaurus Rex: A Standard of Care
That Could Not Adapt, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 109, 111 (2005).
147. Id.
148. Charlotte E. Rennie & Mairead C. Dolan, The Significance of Protective Factors
in the Assessment of Risk, 20 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 8–22 (2010).
149. Michiel de Vries Robbe´ et al., Protective Factors for Violence Risk: The Value for
Clinical Practice, 3 PSYCHOL. 1259–63 (2012).
150. Id.
151. Id.; Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978).
152. Richard Rogers, The Uncritical Acceptance of Risk Assessment in Forensic Prac-
tice, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 595–605 (2000).
153. Id.
154. Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk
Probabilities on Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
83 (2011).
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ria,155 yet these standards are still being used. Morse articulated that
the terms such as “likely” and “harm” are both nonscientific and vague
and that the use of such predictive criteria in mental health law re-
quires “an honest and rigorous assessment of the accuracy of behav-
ioral predictions.”156
While clinical and actuarial predictions of dangerousness do not
sufficiently predict dangerousness, future technical advances may.
Looney suggests that neuroimaging technology may be able to predict
criminal behavior and future dangerousness in sex offenders.157 Rec-
ognizing that studies show that violent persons and convicted
criminals have abnormalities in their prefrontal cortexes and other
brain dysfunctions, Looney suggests that neuroimaging may be used
to find evidence of these abnormalities.158 While neuroscience and
neuroimaging have been used to suggest a person is not guilty by rea-
son of insanity, he asserts that these techniques may also prove useful
in predicting future dangerousness.159 At the current time, however,
there are no sufficiently reliable methods for predicting
dangerousness.
Because of the Supreme Court’s vague “mental abnormality” stan-
dard160 and the lower courts’ inability to accurately assess dangerous-
ness, there is a strong argument that SVP laws are invalid. Due
process provides that a law is void for vagueness if it does not give fair
warning and if it allows for arbitrary and discriminatory applica-
tion.161 The Supreme Court has held that the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine applies to both civil and criminal actions where the “exaction of
obedience to a rule or standard . . . was so vague and indefinite as
really to be no rule or standard at all.”162 The lack of an objective legal
standard for the requisite “mental abnormality” and the reliance on
inaccurate assessments of dangerousness fails to sufficiently define
what characteristics are sufficient for commitment under SVP stat-
utes. Offenders may be arbitrarily committed based on ambiguous def-
initions and unreliable predictions of future risk. Because SVP laws
lack sufficiently defined characteristics and measurable standards,
these statutes are unconstitutionally vague.
155. Morse, supra note 151, at 561.
156. Id. at 592.
157. J.W. Looney, Neuroscience’s New Techniques for Evaluating Future Dangerous-
ness: Are We Returning to Lombroso’s Biological Criminality?, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 301, 307 (2010).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 303–07.
160. See supra section III.A.
161. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
162. A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
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IV. CLARIFYING THE NATURE OF SVP STATUTES
The purpose of the criminal justice system is to prevent harm.163
Harm is prevented by punishing individuals that have harmed or by
using the threat of punishment to deter those that would commit
harm.164 The Supreme Court’s holdings that SVP statutes are civil in
nature belies the fact that these statutes are being used as punish-
ment. The punitive nature of SVP statutes is evidenced by both their
purpose and effect. Hart has articulated that the difference between
criminal and civil actions is moral condemnation and that “[i]t is the
expression of the community’s hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict
which alone characterizes physical hardship as punishment.”165 The
imposition of “unpleasant physical consequences” constitutes punish-
ment if there is a “community condemnation of [the] anti-social con-
duct.”166 SVP commitments restrict an individual’s liberty by
confinement in a prison, institution, mental hospital, or other similar
facility. An offender is condemned both in his criminal adjudication
and again by his commitment as a sexual predator.
A. Maintaining Sex Offender Culpability
Because SVP statutes require a finding of mental abnormality, it
could be argued that civil commitment mitigates the expression of
moral outrage by labeling an individual as mentally ill. In most con-
texts, labeling an offender as manifesting a mental illness or abnor-
mality or determining that an individual is unable to control his or her
offensive behavior identifies that person as less responsible or blame-
worthy. Should a determination that a sex offender has a mental ab-
normality such as pedophilia lessen that offender’s blameworthiness?
The answer is no. Child molestation is a heinous crime with devastat-
ing consequences, and mental disorders such as pedophilia do not
render the offender less responsible. Should the finding of mental ab-
normality mitigate society’s condemnation of sex offenders? The an-
swer to this question is no. In most contexts, a finding that a person is
mentally ill is a measure that justifies commitment and renders that
person less culpable for his conduct. In contrast, SVP statutes distort
the judgment of blameworthiness by blurring the lines between crimi-
nal and mental health laws. SVP statutes do not diminish the culpa-
bility of offenders because (1) most states require a conviction, and
(2) there is inherent condemnation contained in the language of the
statutes.
163. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2 (5th ed. 2010).
164. Id.
165. Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
405 (1958) (quoting George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitu-
tion of the United States, 33 B.U. L. REV. 176, 193 (1953)).
166. Id.
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The majority of SVP laws require a determination that an individ-
ual is a sexually violent predator.167 “Predator” is defined as “one who
preys, destroys, or devours.”168 This statutory language clearly consti-
tutes moral outrage for committed individuals and minimizes any di-
lution of culpability that may occur. Furthermore, this language likely
stigmatizes the offender in such a way that his commitment makes
him even more reprehensible than if he had simply been convicted.
This further supports the argument that SVP statutes are punitive.
An objective analysis of SVP laws leads to the conclusion that
these statutes constitute punishment, but the Court has consistently
held the statutes are not punitive by interpreting them as civil in na-
ture. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,169 the Court set forth seven
factors used in determining whether a statute is civil or punitive in
nature.
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it ap-
pears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned . . . .170
The Court said that each factor was relevant and “may often point in
differing directions.”171
Applying these factors to SVP laws leads to the conclusion that the
statutes are punitive in nature. First, predator confinement involves
significant restraint. Individuals are often housed in prisons or simi-
lar environments, and such confinement has historically been re-
garded as punishment. Second, many state statutes have a
requirement that an individual be convicted of one or more sexual of-
fenses to be eligible for civil commitment.172 In Hendricks, the Court
used the fact that Kansas’s SVP Act did not require a conviction in its
determination that the statute was civil in nature.173 However, many
states do require a conviction174 and thus, only apply SVP laws after a
finding of scienter. Third, while the Court has consistently stated that
167. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(5); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.10(1); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59–29a02(a); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135–E:2(XII)(b); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4–27.26; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(9).
168. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016).
169. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 169.
172. See In re J.R., 277 Neb. 362, 762 N.W.2d 305 (2009) (holding that a prerequisite
of Nebraska’s SVP statute is a criminal conviction for a sex offense).
173. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997).
174. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(5); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01(1)(b); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(9).
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SVP laws do not promote retribution and deterrence,175 this view is
difficult to defend. While a discussion of criminal justice theories is
beyond the scope of this Article, it would be fair to conclude that the
threat of indefinite confinement would deter predators from engaging
in sexually violent conduct or at a minimum, these statutes may be
intended to deter individuals. In Hendricks, the Court stated that the
persons committed are “by definition suffering from a ‘mental abnor-
mality’ or a ‘personality disorder’ that prevents them from exercising
adequate control over their behavior. Such persons are therefore un-
likely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.”176 However, statis-
tics show that the number of sexual assaults reported has declined
more than thirty percent since SVP statutes were enacted.177 With
respect to retribution, locking up sexually violent predators indefi-
nitely would certainly be “an expression of society’s moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct.”178 Fourth, the behaviors involved in a
predator’s underlying criminal offense constitute crimes and, there-
fore, support a finding that SVP statutes are punitive. Finally, SVP
statutes have alternative purposes of treatment of the offender and
the protection of society; however, the Court has stated that treatment
is not required in civil commitments because the state has an interest
in protecting the public from dangerous individuals with treatable as
well as untreatable conditions.179 Applying the factors outlined in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez supports the conclusion that SVP stat-
utes are punitive.
The Court has said that a statute “would be criminal if it was suffi-
ciently punitive ‘either in purpose or effect.’ ”180 While the Court held
that Kansas’s SVP statute was not intended to be punitive,181 its leg-
islative history conclusively shows that it was. In support of the stat-
ute, the Kansas Attorney General testified:
Most new laws against criminal conduct tend to provide punishment after the
victimization has occurred. Senate Bill 525 will act prospectively and be pre-
ventative of criminal conduct and not just punitive. You have a rare opportu-
nity to pass a law that will keep dangerous sex offenders confined past their
scheduled prison sentence. As I am convinced none of them should ever be
175. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346; Allen v. Illi-
nois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
176. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362–63.
177. JANE WISEMAN, INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL OFFENDING (PART I), SEX
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING INITIATIVE (2015) (reporting
that the number of sexual assault victimizations in the United States dropped by
more than thirty percent between 2002 and 2011).
178. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
179. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366.
180. Seling, 531 U.S. at 269.
181. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 347.
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released, I believe you, as legislators, have an obligation to enact laws that
will protect our citizens though incapacitation of dangerous offenders.182
An objective reading of this legislative history demonstrates that the
statute was not civil in nature because its express purpose was to keep
predators incarcerated after their criminal sentence was over to pre-
vent future crimes. In United States v. Melendez-Carrion, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a statute permitting pre-
ventative detention constituted punishment because the detention pe-
riod was not limited and could last up to one year, and the
confinement could not be “characterized as mild.”183 In recognizing
that the purpose of the statute was to protect the community from
future crimes, the court stated:
The difficulty arises from the undeniable fact that incarceration to protect so-
ciety from a person’s future criminal conduct is regulatory in a sense but at
the same time also achieves one of the classic purposes of punishment—inca-
pacitation. . . . Here, the single effect relied on by the Government, prevention
of future crime, is evidence of both a regulatory and a penal purpose. As the
Supreme Court has observed, “One of the reasons society imprisons those con-
victed of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not
make imprisonment any the less punishment.184
Although a statute may be civil on its face, its purpose and effect
may constitute punishment. The Court, however, has refused to ana-
lyze the actual conditions of confinement to determine whether SVP
statutes are ultimately being used as punishment. In Seling v. Young,
petitioner Young challenged his confinement under Washington’s SVP
statute, arguing that the statute was punitive “as applied” to him and,
therefore, violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses in the
Constitution.185 Young alleged that the conditions of his confinement
were punitive because he was subject to more restrictive confinement
than non-SVP committed persons and some state prisoners.186 Young
was confined within a Department of Corrections facility, and he as-
serted that the conditions and restrictions of his confinement were not
reasonably related to a legitimate non-punitive goal and were incom-
patible with treatment.187 The Court rejected his claim, stating “the
question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of
statutory construction,”188 and by assuming that Washington’s SVP
statute was civil in nature, it could not consider whether the act was
punitive “as-applied” to the petitioner.189 The Court explained that
182. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Leroy Hendricks at 13–14, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
183. 790 F.2d 984, 999 (2d Cir. 1986).
184. Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965)).
185. 531 U.S. at 250.
186. Id. at 259.
187. Id. at 259–60 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
188. Id. at 261.
189. Id. at 260.
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“[a] court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where a
party challenging the Act provides the clearest proof that the statu-
tory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the
State’s intention.”190 The Court stated
an as-applied analysis would prove unworkable. Such an analysis would never
conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would
thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme’s validity under the
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. . . . Unlike a fine, confinement is
not a fixed event. As petitioner notes it extends over time under conditions
that are subject to change. The particular features of confinement may affect
how a confinement scheme is evaluated to determine whether it is civil rather
than punitive, but it remains no less true that the query must be answered
definitively. The civil nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered based
merely on vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute.191
Yet, the Court has previously examined confinement conditions when
determining the purpose and effect of statutes.192 Moreover, the Court
has also held that if a prisoner provides “ ‘the clearest proof’ that ‘the
statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to ne-
gate [the State’s] intention’ that the proceeding be civil, it must be
considered criminal . . . .”193 The effect of this holding is that in the
context of SVP commitments, the actual confinement and treatment of
the individuals may not be analyzed to determine if the statute is be-
ing applied punitively. Thus, the effect and purpose of an offender’s
confinement may be punitive as long as the statute is civil on its face.
B. The Exclusion of Juveniles from SVP Commitment
The refusal of states to apply SVP statutes to juvenile offenders
further belies the notion that these statutes are civil in nature. Statis-
tics show that juveniles are responsible for a significant number of
sexual offenses and have a higher risk of sexual recidivism.194 Re-
search also shows that sex offender registration has little, if any, de-
terrent effect on these offenders.195 While juveniles may be committed
under SVP statutes in some states, some explicitly exempt juveniles
190. Id. at 261 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
191. Id. at 263 (internal citations omitted).
192. Id. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; Schall v. Mar-
tin, 467 U.S. 253, 269–71 (1984).
193. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980).
194. See Amanda M. Fanniff et al., Juveniles Adjudicated for Sexual Offenses: Falla-
cies, Facts, and Faulty Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 789, 789–802 (2016) (stating that
juveniles represented 15.56% of forcible rape arrests and 16.97% of other sexual
offense arrests in 2014).
195. Id.; see also Christopher Lobanov-Rstovsky, Registration and Notification for
Juveniles Who Commit Sexual Offenses, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2015) (reporting
research that demonstrated juvenile sexual recidivism rates of 14% after a five-
year follow up period, 20% after a ten-year follow up period and 20% after a fif-
teen-year follow up period).
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from SVP commitment.196 Other states have determined the statutes’
applicability to juveniles with case law.197 States that exempt
juveniles from SVP commitment may do so because of a reduced cul-
pability standard for juveniles. The concept of juveniles being less
blameworthy has been discussed in many Supreme Court cases.198 In
Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court held that capital punishment for
individuals that were under sixteen years of age at the time of their
offense was unconstitutional.199 The Court acknowledged that the
principles of retribution and deterrence were less served by punishing
juveniles because of their reduced culpability and because the likeli-
hood that a teenage offender engages in “the kind of cost-benefit anal-
ysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so
remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”200
In Roper v. Simmons,201 the Court held that imposing the death
penalty on offenders that were under eighteen years of age at the time
of their offense constituted cruel and unusual punishment because
juveniles have an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”202 The
Court recognized juveniles are more reckless and irresponsible than
adults, and these qualities “often result in impetuous and ill-consid-
ered actions and decisions.”203 The Court also noted that because the
character of a juvenile is “more transitory, less fixed,” “as individuals
mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in
younger years can subside.”204 For these reasons, SVP laws would be
more applicable to juvenile offenders than adult offenders. Because
juveniles are less blameworthy, SVP commitment allows states to pro-
tect society by confining youthful offenders until they mature. Because
an offender cannot be confined if he or she is no longer dangerous,
juvenile offenders must be released if their adolescent recklessness
196. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912 (explicitly banning individuals under eigh-
teen years of age from SVP commitment), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A,
§ 1 (permitting SVP commitment for persons adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile
or youthful offender), and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.04 (expressly permitting SVP
commitment for juvenile offenders); see also DeMatteo et al., supra note 15.
197. Compare In re Geltz, 840 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 2013) (holding that a juvenile could
not be committed under Iowa’s SVP laws because the legislature had expressly
stated that juvenile adjudications are not convictions), with In re Belcher, 189
Wash. 2d 280 (2017) (holding that SVP commitment based on acts that occurred
while the offender was a juvenile did not violate the offender’s right to due
process).
198. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005).
199. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
200. Id. at 837.
201. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
202. Id. at 569.
203. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
204. Id. at 570 (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368).
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subsides. Research also shows that juvenile sex offenders respond
more positively to treatment than adults, making a goal of rehabilita-
tion more realistic.205
While juveniles are less blameworthy than adults, “[t]he harm suf-
fered by the victim of a crime is not dependent upon the age of the
perpetrator.”206 States also have a greater interest in committing
juveniles than adults under the doctrine of parens patriae because
“children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take
care of themselves.”207 Because children lack the capacity to care for
themselves, “the juvenile’s liberty interest may, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, be subordinated to the State’s ‘parens patriae interest in
preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.’”208 Although
states have both the duty to protect children under the parens patriae
doctrine and the authority to protect society by using their police
power, some choose to exempt juveniles from SVP commitments be-
cause of their reduced culpability.209 This exemption is evidence that
the statutes are, in fact, punitive.
V. THE UTILIZATION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAWS FOR
PREVENTIVE INCARCERATION
SVP statutes allow states to confine individuals having character-
istics of dangerousness through preventative incarceration. While pre-
ventive incarceration has at times been permitted, it has only been in
certain limited circumstances such as temporary pretrial confinement
and while awaiting a criminal proceeding.210 Some commentators be-
lieve preventive confinement is justified as punishment within the
205. Fanniff et al., supra note 194, at 789–802
206. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264–65 (1984).
207. See id. at 265.
208. Id.
209. See In re Geltz, 840 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 2013) (holding that the statute’s use of
“conviction” demonstrated the legislature’s intent to exclude juveniles that had
been adjudicated as sex offenders); State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 110 (Fla. 2002)
(holding that a juvenile adjudicated as delinquent does not trigger the sexual
predator status provisions of the Predator Act because “upon a plain reading of
the controlling statutes, it is apparent that an adjudication of delinquency does
not fall under the definition of a felony criminal conviction required under the
Act”); see also George Steptoe & Antoine Goldet, Why Some Young Sex Offenders
Are Held Indefinitely, MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.themar
shallproject.org/2016/01/27/why-some-young-sex-offenders-are-held-indefinitely#
.KQhcunt1f [https://perma.unl.edu/6RAM-UE5Q] (noting that of the twenty
states with SVP commitment statutes, thirteen of those states permit civil com-
mitments for individuals who committed their sexual offenses as juveniles).
210. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (permitting temporary preventive
confinement); Schall, 467 U.S. at 261 (permitting preventive detention of juvenile
while awaiting next court date); Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44
(1991) (permitting detention prior to the suspect’s arraignment).
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criminal justice system.211 Husak has suggested that the mere posses-
sion of characteristics that predict future dangerousness may be mor-
ally wrongful and justify preventive detention if dangerousness was
able to be accurately predicted.212 Husak asserts that many criminal
offenses, such as drug possession and drunk driving, are “risk-preven-
tion” crimes that are enacted to prevent harm from occurring.213 If the
state has the police power to punish inchoate or anticipatory offenses,
Husak argues that a state may use preventive detention as punish-
ment by constructing statutes to punish future dangerousness.214
While the government has a substantial interest in protecting soci-
ety, this interest does not make preventative detention any less puni-
tive. “One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is
to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make im-
prisonment any the less punishment.”215 Social policies like the pre-
vention of harm and the punishing of offensive conduct support the
result, but the means by which these goals are met blur the lines be-
tween mental health law and the criminal justice system. If a compe-
tent individual commits a violent sex offense, the state uses its
primary police power to confine the individual through the criminal
justice system. This primary police power may only be invoked if the
individual has the capacity to be held morally responsible for his or
her offensive conduct.216 If a person cannot be held morally responsi-
ble for his or her conduct, a state may civilly commit the individual
using its secondary police power as an alternative to the criminal jus-
tice system.217 By first punishing an offender, then committing him,
these powers are not being used alternatively; they are being used
consecutively. This use is insupportable because the justification for
the secondary police power commitment is necessarily absent when an
individual has already been adjudicated for the conduct in the crimi-
nal justice system. Schopp articulated the manifest defect that is pre-
sent in SVP commitments when stating that the statutes
undermine the moral force of several related components of the legal institu-
tions through which the state exercises the police power. These statutes un-
dermine the moral force of mental health law by misusing the system to
constrain those not properly subject to it and by falsely suggesting that these
people suffer impairment of the capacities of practical reasoning that qualify
them for retributive competence. They also undermine the moral force of the
211. See Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173 (2011).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1176.
214. Id. at 1186.
215. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
216. SCHOPP, supra note 79.
217. Id.
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criminal law by misrepresenting as ineligible to participate in that system
those who have already been punished in that system.218
The line between civil commitment and criminal justice should be
easily distinguishable. Those who are culpable should be adjudicated
with criminal proceedings, and civil commitment should be reserved
for those individuals whose mental illness excuses them from culpabil-
ity. Under its police power, a state should be able to use either civil
commitment or the criminal justice system but not both. Robinson as-
serts that “[i]t would be better to expand civil commitment to include
seriously dangerous offenders who are excluded from criminal liability
as blameless for any reason than to divert the criminal justice system
from its traditional requirement of moral blame.”219 While states have
a substantial interest in protecting society from violent sexual
predators, the danger exists that the lack of clear lines between
mental health law and the criminal justice system may permit states
to bypass constitutional protections in other contexts as well.
VI. STRICT MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND RECIDIVIST LAWS
AS ALTERNATIVES TO SVP COMMITMENT
Civil commitment is justified in the context of insanity acquittals
because individuals that are held to be not guilty because of insanity
cannot be punished because their mental illness makes them not crim-
inally responsible. When a person is dangerous, but not criminally re-
sponsible, there is a “gap” in the criminal justice system. The criminal
justice system does not allow the criminal confinement of dangerous
persons who are not morally responsible for their conduct and civil
commitments are a necessary use of police power to fill this gap. For
sex offenders, no such gap exists. Offenders that are culpable are con-
victed, punished, and incapacitated with criminal incarceration; those
that are not culpable due to mental illness may be committed under
general civil commitment laws. In the early 1990s when current SVP
laws were first being enacted, the average convicted sex offender
served three and a half years of an eight-year sentence, and the aver-
age child molester was released after serving almost three years of a
seven-year sentence.220 Any existing gap is due to the failure of legis-
lators to enact laws that effectively incarcerate violent sexual
predators.
SVP statutes should be replaced with strict mandatory minimum
sentences and recidivist laws. Under the Eighth Amendment, punish-
218. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, COMPETENCE, CONDEMNATION, AND COMMITMENT: AN INTE-
GRATED THEORY OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 186 (Am. Psychol. Ass’n, 2001).
219. Paul H. Robinson, Forward: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous
Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 716 (1993).
220. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 7 (2003).
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ment is “cruel and unusual” only when it is “grossly disproportionate
to the crime.”221 To show that a sentence is excessive, an individual
must challenge the term of the sentence “given all the circumstances
in a particular case” or that the entire class of sentences is dispropor-
tionate given the “nature of the offense” or the “characteristics of the
offender.”222 The standard used in determining whether a sentence is
disproportionate relies on “objective indicia of society’s standards.”223
While capital punishment has been ruled unconstitutional for crimes
that do not result in the death of a victim,224 the Supreme Court has
only two times held that a non-capital sentence imposed on an adult
was unconstitutionally disproportionate. The first was the imposition
of fifteen years of the painful punishment “Cadena temporal” in
1910,225 and the other involved a life sentence without parole for “ut-
tering a ‘no account’ check for $100.”226
Legislatures have the authority to enact laws that incapacitate sex
offenders with criminal incarceration without the use of civil commit-
ment as shown by criminal statutes that impose a sentence of life im-
prisonment for certain sex crimes. For example, Minnesota law
permits a mandatory life sentence without release for egregious first-
time and repeat offenders.227 In a child molestation case, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a mandatory thirty-year sentence
was not grossly disproportionate for an offender that digitally pene-
trated the child and rubbed his penis on the victim’s body.228 The
Eleventh Circuit also upheld a lengthy thirty-year mandatory mini-
mum for a defendant convicted of knowingly crossing a state line with
the intent to engage in a sexual act with a person under the age of
twelve and using a computer to knowingly attempt to entice a person
under the age of eighteen to engage in criminal sexual activity.229
In cases involving repeat offenders, recidivist sentencing statutes
may incapacitate convicted sex offenders with sentences up to life im-
prisonment. The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld a life sentence with-
out the possibility of release or parole for a seventy-one-year-old
defendant that was convicted of rubbing an eight-year-old girl’s but-
tocks in a public library.230 The defendant had two prior convictions
221. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010).
222. Id. at 59.
223. Id. at 60.
224. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the death penalty is
unconstitutional for rape of a child if it does not result in the death of the victim);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is an exces-
sive punishment for the offense of sexual assault).
225. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
226. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983).
227. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3455.
228. United States v. LaFond, 692 Fed. App’x. 242 (2017) (unpublished).
229. United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2010).
230. State v. Sokell, 273 Or. App. 654 (2015).
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for sexually touching or attempting to sexually touch a child for touch-
ing the breast of a twelve-year-old girl at a store and for rubbing a
seven-year-old girl under her dress, but over her swimming suit. The
Iowa Supreme court upheld an offender’s life sentence without release
for a second conviction of sexual abuse stating that “Iowa is anything
but an ‘outlier’ when it comes to the severe treatment of repeat sexual
offenders who target children, use force, or prey on the incapaci-
tated.”231 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a sixty-five-year sen-
tence with lifetime supervision after release for coercing a minor to
engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a vis-
ual depiction of the conduct, and for possession of child pornography
stating that the “heinous nature of his crimes demonstrated the seri-
ousness of the offense.”232 The defendant had previously been con-
victed of statutory rape, and the sentencing court concluded that,
based on his current offenses and prior conviction, the defendant
“could not conform his conduct to societal norms and is a substantial
threat to the community and particularly to children.”233
The court’s statement acknowledging that the defendant “could not
conform his conduct”234 is significant. In Hendricks, the Court justi-
fied Hendricks’s commitment with his inability to control his conduct,
but the Sixth Circuit used this trait as evidence of the defendant’s
need for a more severe criminal sentence. The Sixth Circuit’s view of
repeated crimes as recidivism is superior because had the defendant
truly not been able to conform, his conduct would not have been volun-
tary, and he could not have been morally responsible for the offense.
The Supreme Court’s statement that Hendricks’s inability to control
his conduct satisfied the mental illness requirement is incompatible
with the fact that he had been convicted for the offense. This distinc-
tion is central to the integrity of the process; the inability to control
would undermine the justification of conviction and punishment. The
Supreme Court fails to distinguish between the inability to cease ex-
periencing the desire and the inability to direct one’s conduct accord-
ing to desire. In so far as the risk presented by the offender justifies an
extended sentence, the sentencing statutes should be modified to al-
low for an extended incarceration. If an offender is convicted of a sex-
ual offense, he necessarily has the ability to control his conduct.
Subsequent sex crimes should be treated as recidivism—not mental
illness—and sentenced under criminal statutes.
231. State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 641–43 (Iowa 2012).
232. United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 512–13 (6th Cir. 2008).
233. Id.; see also State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473 (2006); Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d
746, 747 (Fla. 2005); People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107 (2004); State v. Bell,
754 P.2d 55, 57–60 (Utah 1988); Daniel v. State, 78 P.3d 205, 214–16 (Wyo. 2003).
234. Vowell, 516 F. 3d at 512.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Earl Shriner’s ten-year prison term for assaulting two teenage
girls was inadequate. Shriner had a long history of violent behavior
and sexual assaults, and he could have been effectively incapacitated
with stricter criminal statutes. Rather than enacting and enforcing
stricter criminal statutes, Washington used mental health laws to ex-
tend the confinements of its violent sexual offenders. Other states fol-
lowed, bootstrapping civil commitments to criminal sentences for
violent sexual offenses. While SVP statutes are undeniably effective in
protecting the public by incapacitating violent sexual offenders, this
protection requires states to exploit mental health laws and bypass
the due process protections contained in the criminal justice system.
Society may applaud the use of civil commitment in the context of sex-
ual predators, but the blurring of the lines between criminal and
mental health laws is cause for great concern.
The criminal justice system provides for the incapacitation of sex
offenders and the protection of society with an appropriate use of po-
lice power. While civil commitment is necessary for individuals that
are exculpated due to mental illness, sex offenders that are culpable
for their offenses should be punished only under criminal statutes.
While states and the Court have defended SVP statutes by calling
them civil, this Article has demonstrated that the statutes are, in fact,
punitive in nature. Offenders are being convicted, sentenced, incarcer-
ated and then subsequently committed and confined again—often for
the same offense.
Sex offenses are heinous crimes. Deservedly, these crimes inspire
fear and moral outrage, and society must be protected from violent
predators. Nevertheless, the boundaries between mental health laws
and the criminal justice system must be preserved. The only appropri-
ate pathway to incapacitate culpable sex offenders while safeguarding
due process protections is through harsh criminal sentencing
strategies.
